

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE

DATE: April 28, 2010

CALLED TO ORDER: 5:32 p.m.

ADJOURNED: 6:41 p.m.

ATTENDANCE

Attending Members

Benjamin Hunter, Chair
Vernon Brown
Bob Cockrum
Mary Moriarty Adams
William Oliver
Marilyn Pfisterer
Christine Scales
Ryan Vaughn

Absent Members

AGENDA

PROPOSAL NO. 126, 2010 - approves a transfer of \$29,500 in the 2010 Budget of the Marion County Coroner (County General and Federal Grants Funds) to purchase investigation radios and a body rack for storage
"Do Pass" Vote: 8-0

PROPOSAL NO. 127, 2010 - amends the Code to rename, as the division of homeland security, the emergency management planning division of the department of public safety, and to make other technical corrections
"Postpone" until May 19, 2010 Vote: 8-0

Report on Juvenile Court Issues – Judge Marilyn Moores, Magistrates Gary Chavers and Gael Deppert and Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, Christina Ball

PUBLIC SAFETY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE

The Public Safety and Criminal Justice Committee of the City-County Council met on Wednesday, April 28, 2010. Chair Benjamin Hunter called the meeting to order at 5:32 p.m. with the following members present: Vernon Brown, Bob Cockrum, Mary Moriarty Adams, William Oliver, Marilyn Pfisterer, Christine Scales and Ryan Vaughn. Representing Council staff was Robert Elrod, General Counsel.

Chair Benjamin Hunter asked all Councillors to introduce themselves and state which district they represent.

PROPOSAL NO. 126, 2010 - approves a transfer of \$29,500 in the 2010 Budget of the Marion County Coroner (County General and Federal Grants Funds) to purchase investigation radios and a body rack for storage

Alfarena Ballew, Chief Deputy Coroner, Marion County Coroner's Office, thanked Councillors Scales and Oliver for sponsoring and supporting this proposal. She said she is asking for a transfer of funds between characters within the Coroner's Office's budget. She said \$9,500 will be transferred from their General Fund balance to be used for radios for the deputy coroners to respond to various death investigation scenes. Ms. Ballew said that they have hired two additional employees with a grant, and they need radios to respond to those scenes.

Ms. Ballew said the remainder of the money will be transferred from their Character 02 to Character 04 for the purchase of decedent body racks. She said that they have had a significant number of decedents in the facility, some of which are unclaimed due to families not being able to take care of the arrangements. She said that the Coroner's Office will hold those decedents in the facility for an extended period of time, and when the families decide that they simply cannot or will not take care of the arrangements, the Coroner's Office proceeds with cremation. Therefore, space is limited in the cooler system. Ms. Ballew said that the grant funds were obtained to purchase body racks to place inside the cooler for additional storage of about eight decedents.

Councillor Pfisterer asked if the Coroner's Office will have room in the cooler for the additional eight decedents, even with the body racks. Ms. Ballew said that the body racks are designed upward or horizontally. She said currently they have lateral cots that hold the decedents, but these take up more floor space.

Councillor Moriarty Adams moved, seconded by Councillor Vaughn, to forward Proposal No. 126, 2010 to the full Council with a "Do Pass" recommendation. The motion carried by a vote of 8-0.

PROPOSAL NO. 127, 2010 - amends the Code to rename, as the division of homeland security, the emergency management planning division of the department of public safety, and to make other technical corrections

Gary Coons, Department of Public Safety (DPS), Homeland Security and Preparedness, distributed a handout (attached as Exhibit A) and said that this is just a name change request. He said that Exhibit A lists the goals and objectives that the department is trying to achieve. He said that the name change would be in-line with the National Asset Management System (NAMS) that they are to follow through their federal partners. He said that the Homeland Security division within the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) has had a long-standing line-up that they

utilize, and DPS is also working with the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD) to create a division of Homeland Security. Mr. Coons said their primary focus is still on how to respond to natural and human-made disasters, how to prevent them, and how to prepare citizens for them. He said a lot of their funding is grant dollars through an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and some emergency management program dollars that they receive from the federal Homeland Security.

Mr. Coons said that Exhibit A gives details of their objectives, one of which is getting real-time information out to police and firefighters as they are responding to runs. For example, their goal is to have information, such as current tenants and layouts of apartments or information on suspects, sent directly to the vehicle as police or firefighters are responding to runs. He said they are working with the State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Secret Service on all four fronts to accomplish this. Mr. Coons said that Division Chief Dave Owens and Commander Mike Bates are both present, and may be able to answer questions about the division.

Councillor Cockrum referenced page six of the proposal, and asked about the elimination of Sec. 251-404. John Mays, Deputy Director, DPS, answered that he believes that this particular section references who appoints the director of the Department of Homeland Security. He said to be consistent with other public safety departments, that appointment will be made by the public safety director rather than having it go through the public safety board. Councillor Cockrum said that with the strike-through, it appears that the board's authority has been eliminated. Mr. Mays said that he believes the intent is to have this department report to the public safety director instead of the board, just like IMPD and IFD does.

Councillor Cockrum asked about the elimination of Sec. 251-406, with regard to the merit system. Chair Hunter said that he spoke with Frank Straub, DPS Director, and Mark Mertz, Assistant Corporation Counsel, and stated that the merit system is still up for debate, as it has never been enacted within the ordinance. It is his understanding that this is why it has been stricken at this point. He said he believes that there is time to work on that part of the ordinance before it makes it to the full Council.

Councillor Pfisterer asked if Mr. Coons feels that bringing the department in line with the Department of Homeland Security will enhance the potential for the agency to obtain grants. Mr. Coons answered in the affirmative. He said they are becoming more proactive on different kinds of grants. He said that they have always had the UASI grant, and it was always considered to be enough for Indianapolis to handle their own costs. He said that this has never been the case, because the UASI only covers Marion and Hamilton counties. However, the Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS) is making attempts to make it more regional. Mr. Coons said they are currently working on a grant fund with traffic court.

Chair Hunter said that Councillor Moriarty Adams asked a follow-up question with regard to Sec. 251-404, which was stricken. He said that it is his understanding that the language was stricken because much of the oversight would be redundant with the change of the department name and the expansion of the UASI grant coverage. Councillor Moriarty Adams said that her concern was that the presiding officer of the public safety board would appoint the director of the Emergency Management Planning Division, and that would change by striking this section. Chair Hunter said that Director Straub would now appoint that position.

Councillor Vaughn said that Sec. 251-404 references the County Civil Defense Advisory Council pursuant to IC 10-4-1, and asked what powers, duties and obligations are being surrendered by

striking this language. Mr. Mays answered that Mr. Mertz would know the full extent of that, but he believes that the idea is to go under more of the general provisions that are being left in the Code. Councillor Vaughn asked if the responsibilities of the County Civil Defense Advisory Council are outdated or taken over by some other federal, state or local entity. Mr. Mays answered that he believes that to be part of the reason. Councillor Vaughn said that he is cautious about eliminating this Council. Mr. Mays said that he will check with Mr. Mertz and get back with the Committee.

Councillor Oliver commented on temporary appointments, as referenced in Sec. 251-212 (8) on page two of the ordinance. He asked for an example of other areas of the country in which things such as this happen and what type of person in the community would be appointed in cases such as this. Mr. Coons answered that this is a provision that has always been in the Code. He said at any given point, the police chief of the City of Southport or Cumberland may state that they are in charge of their area, and could be appointed to serve in the event of an emergency.

Councillor Oliver referenced the organizational chart in Exhibit A, and asked if the organization is made up of regional resource persons, including members of the outlining counties. Mr. Coons answered that this organizational chart is for Indianapolis/Marion County. However, the Division of Homeland Security is also a part of a district-wide planning council. He said this council has someone from all eight counties. He said there is outside participation of the counties that are a part of the district-wide council.

Councillor Brown asked if Division Chief Owens, who is currently the division chief of training for IFD, will be relinquished from his current duties or if his position with the Division of Homeland Security will be an additional duty. Mr. Coons said that this is still being worked out with IFD Chief Brian Sanford. Councillor Brown asked if the new organizational chart will fit into the old budget for Emergency Management with regard to the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs). Mr. Coons answered in the affirmative, and stated that the only additional employees are through UASI grant funding.

Councillor Cockrum said that he recalls when the hospital in Columbus, Indiana was flooded and they had to bring in some portable hospital units on semi trailers, along with doctors and nurses to operate them. He said, in that case, he was informed that Governor Mitch Daniels had to approve those doctors to operate in the State of Indiana. He said he believes that Sec. 251-212 (8) is intended to be similar to that.

Councillor Vaughn said that there was an amendment that was going to be offered, but he is not going to make the motion, as the motion replaces Sec. 251-404, which would replace the part that is stricken, and he is not very comfortable with that because he does not understand what it does.

Councillor Vaughn moved, seconded by Councillor Moriarty Adams, to "Postpone" Proposal No. 127, 2010 until May 19, 2010.

Councillor Vaughn asked if there is a sense of urgency in executing the changes before the next full Council meeting. Mr. Coons answered in the negative. The motion to "Postpone" the proposal carried by a vote of 8-0.

[Clerk's note: Councillor Moriarty Adams left at 6:13 p.m.]

Report on Juvenile Court Issues – Judge Marilyn Moores, Magistrates Gary Chavers and Gael Deppert and Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, Christina Ball

Judge Moores, Marion County Juvenile Court, said that they were invited to attend the meeting by Councillor Brown to give an update on court issues. She said that most of the Committee has been involved at some point with the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) or with Juvenile Court. She said that four years ago, over 200 kids were regularly being detained in a 144-bed juvenile detention facility, and they were basically being detained on the basis of whatever law enforcement charged them with at the time that they came into the detention center. She said these charges were without regard to whether the offender was actually a risk to public safety or whether they posed a flag risk. Judge Moores said that they did this despite the fact that there was clear data showing that there was a risk factor with taking low-level offenders and securely detaining them with high-level offenders. Therefore, JDAI began four years ago, and is a true revolutionary reform method for operating juvenile courts. She said that former Chief Probation Officer, Robert Bingham, led the program with experience from doing it in another jurisdiction. Judge Moores said that JDAI basically focuses on two things: making data-driven decisions and only detaining kids that pose an actual threat to public safety or are a flag risk. She said they were fortunate enough to have a computer system that captures the amount of data that they need to do this. Judge Moores introduced Magistrate Gael Deppert, who is the coordinator of JDAI; Chief Probation Officer, Christina Ball and Chief Magistrate Gary Chavers.

Ms. Ball distributed a handout (attached as Exhibit B) and discussed the information about the program. She said they want to update the Committee on four areas that have been the main focus of the program over the last four years. Her presentation included the following key points:

- Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI)
 - System reform effort
- Focus of JDAI Reform efforts in Marion County
 - Hopefully the Committee will see how data has been used and collaboration with other stakeholders to make improvements in the four areas.
- Reception Center/Family and Youth Interventions (FYI) program
 - JDAI in a couple of other jurisdictions
 - Gives Juvenile court an alternative intake process up front.
 - Prior to this effort, everyone came into one area (low-risk and high-risk).
 - Low-risk youth are being diverted out of the formal court system completely.
 - FYI allows crisis intervention to be done at the point of arrest.
 - Pilot was contracted with Choices, Inc. to run the program and housed it with Youth Emergency Services (YES) on Keystone Avenue in the north and northeast districts.
 - Every child that was arrested in these areas that met the criteria was taken through the program.
- Juvenile Intake Process
 - There are now two separate doors for offenders to enter: the receiving, screening, and release (RSR) door, where main delinquency offenses go through and the FYI door, where low-risk offenses go through.
- Evaluation of Reception Center
 - Received a technical assistance grant through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).
 - Evaluation was done in 2009 to look at the operation when it was still run by YES.

- Findings are the result of the children that went through the Reception Center.
- The Reception Center currently operates out of the Juvenile Court Annex and operates 24 hours, seven days a week.

Magistrate Chavers said that he joined the Juvenile Court in 2007. Prior to that, he was with the Marion County Prosecutor's Office for over 20 years, supervising the juvenile division. He discussed the following information, and his key points include:

- Initial Hearing Court
 - Created because of discussions between Judge Moores and Magistrate Chavers, in an attempt to provide consistency in terms of early decisions.
 - The most important decision for the child in Juvenile court is made at the first hearing.
 - The other concept is to follow the Statute of the Juvenile Court system.
 - The Statute for a petition in Juvenile Court requires the court to determine that there is probable cause for the offense and if it is in the best interest of the child and/or the public for a formal petition to be filed.
 - Previously, if a charge was presented by the Prosecutor's Office, it was allowed to automatically move forward.
 - This allowed a lot of low-level offenses to go through and clog the court system, did not help the kids, and did not help public safety.
 - Stopped cases from going through if it was not necessary, but those cases were still examined for possible service needs.
 - Allowed judicial and probation resources on more serious offenders.
- Alternatives to Detention
 - Designed to help kids.
 - Used home detention type programs, electronic monitoring, and GPS units (which allows children's whereabouts to be tracked at any given time).
 - There is also a day reporting program for higher-level offenders who are expelled from school.
 - Children have to report to a facility ran by Goodwill that not only shows their whereabouts, but also provides training and programs including an educational component.
 - There is an evening reporting program, run by community partners, for children who need supervision after school.
- Pre-trial Release Options
 - Pre-trial Release Continuum
 - Ms. Ball stated that this gives details about each alternative and the evening reporting sites are listed here.
 - IJJTF stands for Indiana Juvenile Justice Task Force.
 - There have been a few amazing stories about kids who were allowed to stay in the programs after completing their pre-trial release.
 - Detention Risk Assessment Instrument (DRAI) is an objective tool for every child that goes into the detention center and is used to make the original decision on whether a child needs to be detained from the release area for court.

- This is important to keeping the detention center population down and keeping the public safety aspect of the court.
- Promising Outcomes
 - Statistics indicate that re-arrest rates and failure-to-appear (FTA) rates are getting better.
 - Ms. Ball stated that the statistics are from 2009.
 - Statistics for re-offense rates are able to be broken down into types of re-offenses.
 - Status offense is something like run-aways.
 - The focus is more on the misdemeanor and felony re-offenses, because these are the types of offenses that will directly impact the community when looking at public safety.
 - Programs are still relatively new and the Juvenile Court is still in the process of looking at what is working and what is not, and how to tweak things to improve outcomes.

[Clerk's note: Councillor Vaughn left at 6:18 p.m.]

Ms. Ball continued with the following key points:

- Alternatives: 2008 vs. 2009
 - The increased FTA rate for 2009 was pretty negligible, but there was still an increase.
 - Re-offense rate for electronic monitoring increased, so they will look at that in the coming months to determine what can be done to bring that number back down.

Magistrate Chavers highlighted the following key points:

- Detention Statistics
 - Average daily population
 - The graph shows that the big decreases happened when the system changes began.
 - The numbers have been pretty steady from 2007-2009, but they believe they can do better without compromising public safety.
 - There are currently only 85 children in the detention facility, and it has been that way for the past few weeks.
 - Total admissions
 - Defined by when a child is brought to the detention center area and goes through the RSR (intake), has a risk assessment, and a decision is made on whether the child needs to be detained for court.
 - A hearing must take place within 48 business hours if a child must go to court.
 - The risk assessment was first used as a pilot on about 90 kids, and the comparison of the old method versus the risk assessment method indicated that for years, the Juvenile Court was not making good objective decisions on who should be detained in the detention center.
 - This is the result of the large decrease in admissions.
 - The court has also learned that the child that starts in detention is more likely to stay in detention.

- Effect on Public Safety
 - The data shows that JDAI is not having a negative effect on public safety.
 - The vast majority of the children currently in the detention center need to be there.
 - The court tries not to keep the children in the center for a long period of time.
 - The data indicates that the initiatives are working.

Councillor Cockrum asked if there is now room in the building for something else to be housed. Judge Moores said that they have also had to implement a classification system in the detention center to comply with the Department of Justice, which allows them to keep kids safer. She said they are looking to see if some of that space can be closed and used for some of the alternatives or to add other programs for the kids and families that come through the system. Councillor Cockrum said that the Probation Department is looking for space. Judge Moores said that they do not have that much space, but the juvenile probation officers are currently located in the schools and it works great. Judge Moores added that the kind of data that they presented is also what is needed for the adult system.

Councillor Pfisterer said that she has worked with Ms. Ball in the past on the Early Intervention Planning Council (EIPC) and she applauds the Juvenile Court system, as she believes that confinement is not always the answer. She asked, with respect to the pre-trial release continuums and the alternatives, if there are also other services offered such as mental health assessment and anger management. Ms. Ball answered that each of the evening reporting centers offer different programs and services, depending on what they offer general kids that come in off the street. She said that the IJJTF specifically has some counseling built into their program and a lot of the other agencies offer mentoring, as well as other interventions up front. Ms. Ball said that formal referrals to counseling typically happen after adjudication. However, they try to provide services as soon as possible where it is possible.

Councillor Brown thanked Chair Hunter for allowing the presentation and Judge Moores and her colleagues for coming before the committee to give this presentation. He said these initiatives are saving kids and these are the kinds of things that should be considered during the budget process, so that money is given on the front end instead of the back end. He said that he has had the opportunity to work with the Forest Manor evening reporting center and some of the kids that are involved in some of the programs there. The children are very happy with the programs and feel that they have a safe place to go.

Councillor Brown asked if there is a cost savings for those who are not securely detained. Ms. Ball answered in the affirmative.

Chair Hunter thanked Judge Moores and her colleagues for coming and providing the Committee with this information.

Councillor Scales asked how recruitment of community partners is going and how the issue of disproportionality is going for JDAI. Ms. Ball said that community partners with the alternatives have been pretty stable since the program began. She said they are constantly trying to recruit additional people for the steering committee and the other sub-committees that work on the JDAI project to help develop ideas and programs for the kids. Magistrate Deppert said, to the extent that there would be funding available to help support evening reporting centers, there are a number of community-based organizations interested in participating. She said that Ms. Ball was very intentional in

designing evening reporting centers to allow a small number of children referred by the court to slip in and integrate with the existing population of kids, so that they would not stand out. She said the program allows these kids to attend social activities, supervised by healthy adults, have a lot of fun, learn some good lessons and receive training, mentoring, and education even though they do not immediately realize it.

Magistrate Deppert said, with respect to dis-proportionality, that they find themselves struggling with making a good effort in reducing dis-proportionality. She said this is because they realize that every decision point, from arrest through adjudication, placement and commitment, indicates that the number of children of color is much higher across the board than the number of children of color in the general population. She said that they have applied for and have received funding through the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute (ICJI) to contract with the Burns Institute to help reduce dis-proportionality. She said that the Burns Institute is nationally recognized for its work in helping to identify practical strategies to reduce dis-proportionality. Magistrate Deppert said that they have begun working with the Burns Institute, and the Institute will come back to town in May to interview piece-stakeholders, which will include a number of community-based organizations. She said with this partnership, they will discuss how they can increase options available to reduce the number of children in secure detention, keep public safety paramount, and improve outcomes for youth. She said they will also do a meet-and-greet and ideas session with a number of ministers and volunteers who regularly work with the youth in the detention center. Magistrate Deppert said that these meetings, discussions and sessions will result in a report that will be available in late June.

Sue Patterson, Director of Finance, Marion County Superior Court, discussed the funding for these programs. She said that the reception center is currently funded by a one-year grant and the evening reporting centers have been funded out of prior year funds in the current budget, but it will be a challenge at the end of 2010 to see if the funds will make it through 2011. She added that the bonds for the Juvenile Center will be paid off in 2012, and the bond payment is in the courts' budget, which is about \$1.6 million. Ms. Patterson said that when the Juvenile Center was built about 20 years ago, the concept of juvenile incarceration was different and the center was built to be a mini-jail. She said that is not the program that is currently being worked, so between now and the end of 2011, they will return to the Council with ideas of how the program needs to run and how to keep the costs to the county low.

Chair Hunter said that he always says that community policing is no longer a responsibility of just the police department, as it takes everyone in the community and the courts as well.

Councillor Oliver thanked Judge Moores and her colleagues for their work, and said they seem to be advocates for the children. He asked what the criteria is for minor children who are in the system, who may have committed a serious offense, to be moved through the system and waived over once they reach adulthood or with respect to being tried as an adult. Judge Moores said that there are a number of criteria for a waiver, and those sometimes change by statute. She said that the data on waivers says that children under 18, who have committed an offense and are waived to the adult system, recidivate more quickly, more violently and more frequently. She said there is not a lot to recommend waivers to the adult system unless the plan is to never see that child out on the streets again. She said that waivers can be pretty short-sided in terms of understanding the long-term effects of what it does for those children as they become adults. Judge Moores said that they take waivers very seriously and she feels that children can be changed, and that is not necessarily true for hardened adult criminals, so they take this as a chance to make a difference for youth.

Members of the Public Safety and Criminal Justice Committee


April 28, 2010

Page 9

Judge Moores said that they have been able to do JDAI with full participation and cooperation of the police department. She said they have had wonderful input and support from law enforcement.

With no further business pending, and upon motion duly made, the Public Safety and Criminal Justice Committee of the City-County Council was adjourned at 6:41 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,



Benjamin Hunter, Chair
Public Safety and Criminal Justice Committee

BH/nsm



Strategic Plan & Design

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	- 3 -
Homeland Security Organization Chart.....	- 2 -
Vision.....	- 6 -
Guiding Principles	- 6 -
Goals and Objectives	- 8 -
Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)	-14-
Implementation Steps.....	- 27 -
Summary	-31-



Executive Summary

The City of Indianapolis Department of Public Safety aims to establish strategic objectives around which “the entire public safety department can mobilize to secure the City of Indianapolis Metropolitan Area from the dangerous and evolving threat of terrorism, prepare and mitigate for natural disasters, develop intelligence competencies, and plan and secure special events.” It aligns and focuses homeland security functions into several critical mission areas and identifies foundations that cut across all these mission areas. These foundations represent main sources of strength to draw upon in supporting and enabling terrorism-fighting activities.

The Department of Public Safety’s made significant positive change by stepping away from the previous efforts or paradigm and redirecting processes, procedures, attitudes, structures and systems into a new high performing – accountable Division of Homeland Security through:

- ◆ “All hazards” risk based strategic and operational planning models,
- ◆ Decentralized emergency response criteria with defined output/outcome objectives,
- ◆ Significant emphasis on crime reduction/prevention, injury/loss prevention roles and responsibilities, and
- ◆ Community centric organization philosophies.



This plan will define the overall vision, guiding principles, goals, and implementation steps of the newly created Division of Homeland Security. This document will serve as the roadmap for the development of the Division into a fully-functioning and united public safety system.

Application of the principles of risk management within the new Division of Homeland Security can lead to enhanced safety and security through a redirection of energies on clear, objective risk assessments and measurable performance outcomes focused on prevention, preparedness and mitigation on all hazards versus the current traditional response to a specific situation paradigm. This includes specific roles for the sections under the division and the creation of a Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section to assist in crime fighting and prevention. The framework shall be structured to maintain the roles and responsibilities of each sector for funding and delivering services and at the same time maintaining situational awareness with the Director of Public Safety for guidance and direction.

The direction of this new division initiative is that every member of each section will receive an appropriate level of education, equipment and technology to perform their duties. In addition to the recommendation of a paradigm shift for this new division, the initiative shall recommend new duties and responsibilities for the Emergency Preparedness and Management, Metro Police Homeland Security, and Metro Fire Tactical Resources. This opportunity has far reaching potential going well beyond simple change to the creation of a high performing and accountable public safety services.

Building Effective Collaboration across Divisions of Public Safety


A key design question in going forward with a network approach to service delivery in a multi-level local system is how to retain the benefits of a new direction while creating additional value for the citizen through a more collaborative approach to service integration across divisions of public safety.

The Division is currently examining several homeland security service delivery integration initiatives in other cities, to find a common element of their success in providing public safety services within a homeland security paradigm. Based on these observations, it is the belief of the management of the Division that there is a need for more direct engagement in service innovation. Greater engagement will allow the eventual formation of new and more collaborative mechanism that is necessary in order to underpin the formation of shared and more seamless homeland security models.

Strategies Common to the Successful Integration of Service Delivery Systems

- ◆ **Create a collaborative network-based governance framework.** Forge a more robust set of conditions and learning opportunities for accelerating the development of network-based governance mechanisms that transcend traditional jurisdictional silos.
- ◆ **Engage employees and divisions in design and delivery.** Engage a wider set of stakeholders including employees and divisions to create input-output-outcome delivery models.
- ◆ **Create a common technology infrastructure.** Collaboratively build a service architecture used by all levels of public safety that emphasizes open standards and interoperable information systems across local, state and federal public safety partners as much as possible.
- ◆ **Agree on a common identity management framework.** Create a formalized governance framework that emphasizes collaborative planning and shared forms of accountability. This framework would serve as a foundation for the development of a system to create a common approach to identify individuals participating in sections within the new division.

Organization Chart



Vision

A secure City of Indianapolis/Marion County, a confident public, and a strong and resilient society and economy. The Division will lead a unified City of Indianapolis Department of Public Safety effort to secure, prevent, prepare, respond, and ensure resiliency from natural or human-made threats and hazards to the city.

Guiding Principles

Use an All-Hazards Approach

Our City faces threats from both natural and human-made sources. We will take an all-hazards approach to emergency management that allows us to respond effectively to all emergencies, whether caused by acts of nature or by our enemies.

Build Trust through Collaboration and Partnerships

We do not carry out the homeland security mission alone, and we can succeed only with the help of all levels of government, the private sector, academia, and the general public. We will be a trustworthy partner in building active layered defenses and local-metropolitan resilience. Through education and outreach, we will foster homeland security expertise across multiple disciplines to serve as an indispensable resource for the city. We will give our citizens the ability to understand what tools they need to protect and help themselves and their neighbors in an emergency.

Apply Risk Management

The homeland security mission is complex, and resources are constrained. The Division will use qualitative and quantitative risk assessments to inform resource decisions. These resources will be targeted at the most significant threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences.

Develop a Culture of Preparedness

Disasters are a certainty, though when and where they will strike is unpredictable. This certainty should inform and motivate our preparedness. The Division will continue to foster a culture of preparedness throughout all levels of society and will emphasize the responsibility of the entire City to be flexible and capable of coping with a broad range of challenges.

Ensure Accountability

Achieving our goals requires accountability through the Department of Public Safety – Office of the Director. This system will encourage innovation, recognition, mutual respect, and teamwork.

Capitalize on Emerging Technologies

Innovations in science and technology will enable us to successfully execute the Division's missions. In addressing all our goals and objectives, we will use technology to enhance security and increase efficiency.

Work as an Integrated Response Team

The Division was formed to unify the Department of Public Safety and Departments within City-County Government to create the capacity to deal with terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. By embracing a single set of guiding principles, from the Director of Public Safety to the frontline employee, we will forge a single entity working together to secure the City of Indianapolis/Marion County.

The Department does not operate in a vacuum. Other Federal, State, and local institutions participate actively in the Division's efforts to disrupt terrorist activities and in the preparation for and response to major disasters, as do our private and non-profit sectors and international partners. We will continue to work cooperatively to ensure that all of the instruments of local power – including leadership, specialized technical expertise, research, and development investments – are brought to bear on the challenges we face in a coordinated and unified manner.

Be Flexible


Our security measures, preparedness, and response will always be capable of meeting diverse needs in a changing world. Our strategies will be flexible. We will be creative and nimble in defending the city against all threats. We will anticipate future threats and will not simply react to them once they have occurred. We will identify key factors external to the agency that could significantly affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives.

Indianapolis Division of Homeland Security

Mission Area Taxonomy

Vision: A safer, less vulnerable, and more resilient Indianapolis with Emergency Management enabling the capacity to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from hazards and disasters.

Mission Statement: Our mission is to prepare for, respond to, mitigate and recover from catastrophic events. Through plans, policies, and procedures we strive to increase the resiliency of the Indianapolis Community while minimizing the impact of those events upon the citizens of Indianapolis and Marion County. We adhere to the highest ethical standards while protecting life and property to ensure the timely restoration of services should any hazard occur within our community.



Goals and Objectives

Performance

Mission-oriented programs provide the means and strategies we use to achieve our goals and objectives. We quantitatively define outcomes and measure results using performance measures based on these programs. We continually strive to improve program alignment to our goals and objectives, and improve our performance measures.

Ensure Continuity of Government Communications and Operations

Implement continuity of operations planning at key levels of the city government. We will improve our ability to continue performance of essential functions/business and government operations, including the protection of government personnel, facilities, city and county leaders, and the city's communications infrastructure across a wide range of potential emergencies. We will integrate public and private agencies in simulated training enhancing working relationship and building a broad base of understanding of the capabilities and competencies of first responder agencies and personnel.

Create an Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) Section

We will create an interdisciplinary research oriented section involving information technologies, computer science, public policy, bio-informatics, medical informatics, and social and behavior studies as well as local law enforcement intelligence experts to support counter-terrorism and homeland security missions in Indianapolis of anticipation, interdiction, prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist acts. ISI will be organized in four main streams focusing on Information Sharing and Data/Text Mining, Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Responses, Terrorism Informatics, and Computational Criminology.

Prevent and Detect Radiological/Nuclear Attacks

We will reduce the risk of, and guard against, nuclear and radiological attacks in the City of Indianapolis Urban Area. We will develop and implement measures aimed at preventing successful introduction of nuclear and radiological weapons into the Indianapolis Urban Area, whether by air or land. We will develop and deploy systems and intelligence capabilities – both domestically and international – to detect and prevent nuclear or radiological attacks at our borders or within our city.

Prevent, Detect, and Protect Against Biological Attacks

We will lead efforts to establish an integrated Bio-defense structure. We will systematically prioritize and focus efforts, including risk-based threat assessments, biological detectors, bio-surveillance, forensics, and emergency planning systems that can quickly detect, characterize, and respond to biological attack. We will prepare individuals, families, and communities to respond effectively to biological attacks in the Indianapolis/Marion County Urban Area and minimize consequences.

Prevent and Detect Chemical and Explosive Attacks

We will reduce the risk of and guard against chemical and explosive attacks in the city. We will reduce the risks to our citizens and infrastructure from hazardous chemical and explosive attacks and incidents.

Protect and Strengthen the Resilience of the City's Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR)

We will lead the effort to mitigate potential vulnerabilities of our City's critical infrastructure and key resources to ensure its protection and resilience. We will foster mutually beneficial partnerships with public and private sector owners and operators to safeguard our critical infrastructure and key resources against the most dangerous threats and critical risks. We will strengthen resilience of critical infrastructure and key resources.

Critical clusters are groups of related infrastructure that can be disrupted through a single natural or human-made hazard, excluding the use of weapons of mass destruction. Sectors may include critical clusters on their respective Sector Lists. In addition, if the disruption of the cluster could result in consequences that meet the Tier 1 and Tier 2 thresholds, the cluster is nationally critical, and should be nominated to the Tier 1 and Tier 2 List through the Tier Consideration function. Critical clusters may contain assets that individually meet the Tier 1 and Tier 2 criteria.

Tier 1 and Tier 2 Nominations: From your Sector List, you will be able to nominate CIKR that, if disrupted, could result

1. Greater than 2,500 prompt fatalities.
2. Greater than \$25 billion in first-year economic consequences.
3. Mass evacuations with a prolonged absence of greater than one month.
4. Severe degradation of national security-related missions, to include intelligence and defense functions, but excluding military facilities⁶.

CIKR that do not meet the first three criteria threshold, but meet the fourth threshold, will be considered on a case-by-case basis, and adjudicated based upon the strength of the justification. CIKR nominated to the Tiers List will automatically be considered for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 List, and placed on the appropriate list based upon the provided consequence information.


In addition to providing justification for how the nominated CIKR meet the above criteria, you will also be asked to identify which hazards have the potential to disrupt the CIKR. The applicable hazard options do not reflect all possible hazard types, and disruption scenarios outside the scope of these hazards will be permitted, except for disruption scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction in at least two of the first three consequences, or the fourth criteria below:

Improve Cyber Security

We will reduce our vulnerabilities to cyber system threats before they can be exploited to damage the city and Marion County's critical infrastructures and ensure that such disruptions of cyberspace are infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, and cause the least damage possible.

Ensure Preparedness

We will empower our citizens and governments at all levels to be prepared, capable, and ready to respond to adverse incidents. This preparedness will help reduce the loss of life and property from adverse incidents, emergencies, and disasters, including catastrophic events by effectively preparing the City-County's response and encouraging a culture of preparedness and self-sufficiency. We will assist in providing for medical preparedness against public health threats – both naturally occurring and human-made. We will develop and employ joint planning and exercise capabilities to enhance governmental preparedness.



We will empower our citizens to take individual and community actions before and after disaster strikes through effective mitigation and preparedness programs. We will ensure that our citizens and governments at all levels are ready for human-made events, natural disasters, and severe pandemics.

Strengthen Response and Recovery

We will empower our citizens and the local governments at all levels in the Indianapolis Urban Area to effectively respond to and recover from major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic events. We will reduce the immediate loss of life and property from adverse incidents. We will work with our partners to help restore services and rebuild communities after incidents or emergencies.

We will strengthen Indianapolis Urban Area response capabilities. We will act swiftly in response to a disaster, particularly when first responders are overwhelmed. We will deploy the necessary departmental components to assist those affected by a disaster. We will provide professional, trained, and certified leaders and staff to manage disaster relief and recovery operations, wherever they might occur.

We will build the foundation of an effective, coordinated response and define the doctrine to guide the Indianapolis Urban Area response. We will lead and sustain the City effort needed for disaster recovery while respecting and supporting the roles of individuals, State and excluded city governments, faith-based and community organizations, and the

private sector. We will increase our ability to deliver quick, compassionate, and easily accessed assistance to individuals and communities through the effective use of technology and streamlined, transparent processes while minimizing the occurrence of waste, fraud, and abuse.

Through an all-hazards continuity-of-operations continuum, the Indianapolis Urban Area and Regional Partners in coordination will identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions.

The All-Hazards Continuity-of-Operations Continuum




Regional Joint Emergency Operations Center




- Coordination Center for Incidents &/ or Special Events
- All Hazards Outdoor Warning Sirens,
- Linking the GIS/GPS into the section

Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)

The current threat has never been more real for large urban areas and especially hosting large events that draw millions into the area as is the case with for the Indianapolis Urban Area. The Indianapolis Urban Area (IUA) consists of the Consolidated City of Indianapolis, Marion County and the surrounding doughnut counties along with the agencies and municipalities within these jurisdictions. The IUA needs to go beyond “Tactical Interoperability” which is based solely on communications to an “Advanced Interoperability” which is proactive and based on the access to, the sharing of, and capturing information vital to daily public safety operations and security. This approach would create a collaborative link between local and regional agencies and municipalities. This will provide local and regional law enforcement with capabilities to directly impact and prevent crime in a collaborative manner.



Tactical Interoperability only allows for collaborative agencies to request, distribute, and monitor resources after or during a crisis event. The current system is designed around audible communications implored once the crisis is identified. There is no preventive aspect of sharing critical information of targets, suspects, descriptions, actual biographical data or alerts. This then puts the public at risk due to the inability to identify in advance suspects who may be planning or engaging in threat activities. Each area within the region is responsible for its own information and the dissemination of that information in a timely matter.



This is a state of risk and liability for the agencies involved in providing for the public safety. For example, each county is responsible for maintaining its own local criminal records systems, which consist of arrest information. Things like criminal history, mug shots, fingerprints, and biographical information are captured by local, regional and state

agencies but not widely accessible. There is little or no ability to share this information with adjacent counties and jurisdictions. A suspect can be stopped and detained by law enforcement in one jurisdiction but have no insight that the suspect is a person of interest in an adjacent jurisdiction. There are many historical cases of crimes against the public at large or individuals that could have been prevented had there been a way to share information in real-time. An example of this has been documented concerning one of the "911" hijackers who was stopped and wanted on a warrant but not accurately identified so released. One of the few shared pieces of information for law enforcement comes through NCIC for warrants or State Wanted list which is still primarily dependent on audible/radio communications. The current method of gathering or obtaining information on suspects in the field is also cumbersome, which limits the amount of information and intelligence that is collected.

Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)

INVESTIGATE · COLLABORATE · INCARCERATE

- Predictable Crime Analysis
- Camera Management, the "fusion" of existing information systems such as INDOT or other camera/sensor equipment
- Collection, process, analysis, and exploitation of information
- MESH networks
- 8 county collaboration alliance
- CompStat - "Successful Crime Analysis System"
-
- Other digital technology trends related to public safety communications coordination
-
- Domestic and International Terrorism Intelligence (Joint Terrorism Task Force)
-
- Joint Hazardous Materials Assessment and Intelligence
- Incident Management Team Support and Resource Center
- Critical Decision Making Sit-Sat Training Simulator



Program Design and Implementation

The **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** can be created as soon as a facility is identified and staffed with two (2) crime analysts, seven (4) tactical analysis coordinators, and one (1) program manager from eligible applicants who have successfully completed initial application and testing. Tactical Analysis Coordinators could be recruited from senior detectives who are about to retire from active service. Their retirement will preserve the jobs of the seven least senior officers among the various partner police agencies who will likely face layoffs in the coming year – without a dramatic budgetary turnaround. Located in available space within a new operations center, **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** would begin immediate base level operations, rapidly adding additional capability as set forth in the timeline. **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** placement in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is deliberate and critical to the emergency response nature of the program. The space will be large enough for the placement of large LCD-type displays, interactive situational data display screens and radio, telephone and Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) stations with enhanced Geographic Information Services (GIS) and data mining capabilities. In some respects, the design will mirror the existing Real Time Crime Centers used by the police departments of New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Memphis. Division of Homeland Security staff have already made site visits to LAPD and have planned trips to Memphis and researched the others to develop a “blending” of the best features of these existing centers. However, Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section would technically not be a “carbon copy” of any existing **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)**, but is a deliberate shift in design to allow small, medium, and large-sized local, state and federal law enforcement, fire and EMA to share such a resource on a regional basis. RTCC will also be unique in the depth of its expanded community-based partnership and its direct overlay, interface and incorporation into 9-1-1 operations on a 24x7x365 basis.

A proactive “Advanced Interoperability” system would enable law enforcement and emergency management-homeland security to work in preventive mode versus a reactive mode to identify and eliminate threats to public safety. This system would be robust enough be used by all regional law enforcement entities and provide critical information for both day to day law enforcement activities as well as emergency response. Advanced interoperability would serve a wide region of law enforcement participants. There would not only be rapid access to critical law enforcement information but also the ability to monitor “at large” individuals through field input devices and kiosks (probation, release check points, etc). The data warehouse would also hold identification of local and national “First Responders,” their associated disciplines and equipment. This would allow local crisis management personnel to validate first responders at the scene of a crisis as well identify those perpetrators or imposters who desire to take advantage of a crisis situation. The system would support information critical to preventing incidents such as, biometric identification, criminal history, and critical intelligence, as well as, provide input at the scene that can be shared by all responders.

Data-Driven Analysis & Intervention

The Center will conduct regional data-driven crime analysis and geo-profiling utilizing the data mining capabilities of a new data warehouse and integrated public-private partnerships; the link/nodal analysis of the Federal LInX system; and joint community/police real-time databases to empower responding officers with instantly actionable leads such as associating eyewitness-provided partial data on license plates, tattoos and street names with known persons, phones, associates and locations; vectoring officers to domestic violence/violent crime alerts; conducting time sensitive geo-profiling on known parolees, sex offenders and gang members to isolate possible suspects; and other advanced data-driven services resulting in quicker apprehension and fewer crimes.

Statistics on violent crimes, violent crime arrests, violent crime prosecutions, number and success of **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** interventions, and the number, frequency and use of databases, video, text and other data streams.

Community-Based Technology-Assisted Intervention

Highly-advanced, technically-supported intervention through the monitoring of integrated video and text feeds from multiple community sources. This includes instant alerts by frequently victimized persons or places with small hand-carried GPS-based alarms, identification and tracking of suspects [through facial recognition, license plate recognition, GPS; video and display technology; and incorporation of video from citizens, neighborhood organizations, businesses and other agencies effectively creating a region-wide “cyber block watch” that is also mobile for major incidents.

The **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** will continually monitor incoming 9-1-1 calls, and will have the same access to the emergency alerts as police officers in the field. Once a caller initiates a report into the 9-1-1 call center, the Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section staff does a brief triage to see if the call is of a nature that would benefit from **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** assistance. For example, following a report of a domestic violence incident in progress, Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section staff would do a quick work up on the suspect – including such vital information as previous law enforcement contacts, the existence of any court-issued protection orders, and the existence of any arrest warrants for the suspect – while simultaneously cueing up any registered video cameras with a view. In addition, when domestic violence or other suspects flee a scene, **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** would continue to provide assistance by creating detailed localized maps and imagery with suggested perimeter lines for responding officers to contain the scene and make capture possible. This map would be proactively “pushed” to responding officers, along with any available booking photo to help make a positive identification. Variances in the level and type of assistance would change depending on the type of emergency call and the level of information needed. For example, in the case of a missing child, Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section would immediately push a map of the area, highlighting the last known location of

registered sex offenders in the area, along with booking photos. Or in a bank robbery, **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** would bring up video from the bank's own video system and take a "snapshot" of the suspect's face. This snapshot would then be examined (using facial recognition software) against the quarter million booking photos available for a possible match against a known subject. Even without a match, the photo would be pushed to all patrol and detective vehicles responding to the scene – a tremendous and immediate lead that would be used in a neighborhood canvass in the event that the subject had left the bank but could still be in the area on foot or had boarded a bus. An added bonus: The **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** would be used as the collection and analysis point for telephoned tips in an ongoing and high-profile serial crime series. **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** could also be used as a 24-hour GIS monitoring point for parolees and sex offenders wearing court-ordered monitoring devices. These are just a few examples.

The heart of the community-based data-driven process will be managed by crime analysts with the assistance of the program coordinator. Using the various techniques available to the analyst, including a GIS-driven alerting system such as CEWS (Crime Early Warning System), crime-related information will be "pushed" via email to the block watch captains for distribution to the entire neighborhood, and citizens and neighborhood organizations will alert **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** of concerns or suspicious activity via a web-drive program, as well by enabling **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** access to our own web or security cameras.


Number and effectiveness of community based partnerships. Periodic surveys of citizens, businesses, neighborhoods and law enforcement officers.

Capabilities & Competencies

The Metropolitan Emergency Communications Agency (MECA) has grown to be the largest Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) in Indiana and is the only agency of its kind to provide law enforcement support in three operational divisions: 9-1-1 Communications, Records Management and Information Technology. **Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)** would maintain a close working relationship with its local, state and federal law enforcement partners.

Crime Analysts will perform traditional crime analysis functions as well as act as coordinators for regional crime analysis and task for support including neighboring counties.

Tactical Analysis Coordinators will be experienced former law enforcement personnel who perform the day-to- day tactical informational support (video, text, voice) 24x7x365 basis.



Impact/Outcomes, Evaluation, Sustainment, Data Collection Plan for Performance Measurement Data Collection

Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR) will certify a willingness and capacity to participate in an evaluation to be managed by the National Institute of Justice. Success of this concept is demonstrated by similar programs in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Memphis. All data collected will be reported quarterly as required. Reporting will be done as per a set guideline. Evaluation will be based on benchmarking and data collection.

Full sustainability is based on the experiences of five other similar centers throughout the country in obtaining public and private funding.

The purpose is to enhance IUA with emerging *intelligence and security informatics* (ISI):

- 1) *Intelligence and Warning*: Information Technology (IT) can help build new information- and intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities to detect future terrorist activities.
- 2) *Public Safety Camera Security*: IT can help to develop identity-management and deception-detection techniques. In addition, IT can help to enhance the security and develop strategic operational models for effective and efficient street- and event-related infrastructure protection.
- 3) *Domestic Counterterrorism*: IT can help to improve information access and sharing, as well as the crime-analysis abilities for and with law enforcement officers.
- 4) *Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets*: IT can help to develop analytic, modeling, and simulation tools for critical infrastructure (including transportation systems), cyberspace vulnerability and risk analysis, and protection.
- 5) *Defending against Catastrophic Threats*: IT can help to develop simulation, detection, and alerting techniques for potential catastrophic threats, such as chemical and biological attacks. IT can also assist in such efforts by focusing on the necessary transportation aspect of carrying out such attacks.
- 6) *Emergency Preparedness and Response*: IT can help to improve information sharing and communication interoperability for IMPD, IFD and EMS before and during emergencies. IT can contribute by providing logistics decision-aiding systems to improve the operational efficiency of responses.

Three primary counterterrorism-related areas:

- 1) Information and network security
- 2) The IT needs of emergency responders
- 3) Information fusion and management

Information and network security research develops approaches and architectures for prevention, identification, and containment of cyber-intrusions and recovery from them. IT needs of emergency responders is expected to deal with issues such as ensuring interoperability, maintaining and expanding communications capabilities during an emergency, communicating

with the public during an emergency, and providing support for decision makers. Information fusion and management for intelligence, law-enforcement, and emergency-response includes data mining, data integration, language technologies, and processing of image and audio data.

Practical and novel Information Technologies, techniques, methods, practices, and systems that can contribute to knowledge in this important division are critically needed, including but not limited to areas such as:


- ◆ Information sharing and system interoperability;
- ◆ Knowledge discovery and knowledge management;
- ◆ Criminal data mining, social network analysis, and event detection;
- ◆ Multimedia and multilingual intelligence and security information analysis;
- ◆ Web-based intelligence monitoring and analysis;
- ◆ Deception detection systems;
- ◆ Intrusion detection systems and information awareness;
- ◆ Cyber-crime detection and analysis;
- ◆ Agents and collaborative systems for intelligence sharing;
- ◆ Crime and intelligence visualization;
- ◆ Bioterrorism tracking, alerting, and analysis;
- ◆ Major disaster prevention, detection, and management (including related intelligent transportation infrastructure and route planning)

Cross-Jurisdictional Information Integration and Analysis Framework. The key to a cross-jurisdictional information integration and analysis framework is identification of three classes of data:

- 1) *Base data* with overlapping information from multiple jurisdictions with multiple object and relation types;
- 2) High volume but relatively simple *supplementary data* to enhance information content;
- 3) Case-specific or *ad hoc* query-specific data expressing important relationships or features.

Given these classes of data, integration can proceed in three steps: transformation of base data; entity-matching to align objects across data sets; and normalization and matching of supplementary data.

The system would act as a rapid access regional data warehouse providing instantaneous intelligence across regional boundaries. Access to the information would be in multiple forms such as, portable handheld computers, MDT's, Kiosks, and workstations. Field devices would be robust to read fingerprints, capture digital images, communicate in multiple formats, and scan information such as barcodes.



The IUA approach to “Advanced Interoperability” has several core components: First is the intelligence or critical information/data sets. Secondly, the approach requires the

integration and synchronization of this intelligence or critical information/data sets in different systems. Third, the information needs to be accessed rapidly and shared across local, regional, and eventually, state agencies. Fourth, the system would require technology that was scalable as well as versatile to maintain speed as information grows. The system applications also need to be available on multiple hardware platforms such as handheld field device, kiosks, and workstations. Lastly, the user needs to have the ability to capture and upload new information in multiple formats from the scene or point of critical contact back to the rapid access data warehouse.


Intelligence or critical information/data sets:

- Identification of an individual is foundational requirements of the system. The Detection, Inspection, and Enforcement technology and standards have developed allowing wide access to many different AFIS systems through a NIST Archive. These non-proprietary databases which are common among all AFIS vendors can be parsed to provide the backend data for rapid identification system utilizing all ten fingerprints. To date, hundreds of millions of prints have been collected and enrolled into systems such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and the Department of Homeland Security's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). IMPD as well has a significant database of over 700,000 files. Fingerprints are by far the largest and most accurate data available for identification. The ability to utilize all ten prints is critical to success.
- Standard data such as current address, age, date of birth, race, and sex. The data could include the spectrum of law enforcement activities, including simple traffic stops, investigatory detentions, and complex criminal investigations
- Criminal history is another widely available form of standard information that would provide invaluable information to public safety and law enforcement. This would be all the arrest information on an individual who has come into contact with law enforcement. Information such as nature of the crime, scars/marks/tattoos, physical description, allegiances, and aliases would be common information that should be shared.
- Alerts both national & local could be synchronized through any of a number of different local or state systems. Information concerning health risks, contamination, weapons, violence and flight risk are some of the common alerts. Others could be added for persons of interest or DNA requirements.

Integration of critical data systems:

- Integrate the current Systems like the JUSTIS (the Court information system), JIMS (the Sheriff's Jail Information Management System), Informer (Probation, Community corrections and Offender reentry data systems), and the Mug Shot (a Sheriff system) into a usable format.

- A regional database integrates all records management systems for the eight-county region. This database would allow police officers in the MSA to have real-time access to all relevant criminal information. The ideal solution would be rapid identification and information management system would synchronize the information from regional systems and make it available to the requestor in seconds.
- Future integration of State level systems into a rapid data warehouse of their own or share in IUA's system.



Information access/sharing:

- Rapid access regional data warehouse providing instantaneous intelligence across the Consolidated City of Indianapolis, Marion County and the municipalities within Marion County
- All eight counties bordering the region would share information and have access to a satellite rapid data warehouse backend to provide synchronization with their current data systems. The municipalities participating with these eight counties would also be allowed to access the rapid data warehouse through their local county or IUA.
- Any agency system such as FBI, State Law Enforcement, ICE, and Homeland Security would also have access and share information.

Technology/Capabilities:

- The system would require an independent data warehouse that would provide flexibility to work with multiple systems without putting search load directly on those systems. The data warehouse would be scalable to adapt to the growth while maintaining a ten second or less response time.
- The system would be required to integrate the critical data from all the different systems. This integration would also allow for information to be captured and updated into the origination system.
- Applications for biometric identification utilizing would need to be at the core of the application to positively identify suspects. Progressive elimination of false positives would be required to achieve the highest percentage of valid identification. The biometrics would need to be flexible to be used in the different environments and applications (book & release, Booking, Warrants, Jail Movement, Probation check-in, etc).
- The applications within the rapid access data warehouse would have to be available on all platforms (Handheld Computers such as MC75, laptops, & workstations).
- The system must have tracking capabilities to view searches done by any user or device as well as information captured within those devices or systems.

Capturing new information:

- The requestor would also be able to add new critical information making it available instantly to other responders or law enforcement officials.
- The system will allow intelligence information to be gathered in a uniform manner throughout the region so that information can be stored in a single repository and used throughout the region. This would also provide the structure for synchronizing information back to the original data mine.

The system needs to have multiple forms of capturing data in the field format. The system needs to capture images, fingerprints, barcode scan, and direct data entry. Multiple communication formats such as Bluetooth, air card, and wireless need to be accessible.

Definitions for Documents of Dissemination

General Public – Includes any person and / or media journalist which is not serving in an official public safety capacity.

Categorization – A sensitivity level to which national security, public safety, law enforcement or critical infrastructure information and material is assigned to denote the degree of damage that unauthorized disclosure would cause to national defense, public safety operations, law enforcement investigations, or public safety protection and to denote the degree of protection required.

Sensitive / Proprietary Information – Any information, including intelligence, which may be categorized as:

- For Official Use Only (FOUO)
- Public Safety Sensitive (PSS)
- Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES)
- Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
- Confidential (C)
- Secret (S)
- Top Secret (TS)

Additionally, sensitive / proprietary information may include any information which is covered under IC 5-14-3-4(19)(I) to include, but not limited to, Public Safety Plans, Operational Plans, Emergency Response Plans, Vulnerability Assessments and intelligence analysis.

For Official Use Only (FOUO) – Information that has not been given a security classification pursuant to the criteria of Public Safety Sensitive or higher, but which may be withheld from the general public because disclosure would cause a foreseeable harm to public safety operations shall be considered as being for official use only (FOUO). FOUO information may only be released to persons who serve in an official public safety capacity.

Public Safety Sensitive (PSS)– Information that could potentially have actionable repercussions for the receiver in planning and preparedness for public safety operations. PSS information may only be released to official and accredited members of a public safety agency.

Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES)– Information that is specific to law enforcement. LES information is any information which, if compromised, could jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation, an undercover law enforcement officer or confidential informant. LES information should only be disseminated to known law enforcement officials or other public safety officials with a need to know.

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) – Any information collected for purposes of a Critical Infrastructure Protection Program and / or is sensitive security related business information provided by private industry to the government under the PCII auspices. PCII is an information-protection tool that facilitates information sharing between the government and the private sector. PCII information may be, but is not limited to the following:

- Analyzing and securing critical infrastructure and protected systems,
- Identifying vulnerabilities and developing risk assessments, and
- Enhancing recovery preparedness measures.

Information submitted, if it satisfies the requirements of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, is protected from public disclosure under The Freedom of Information Act, State and local disclosure laws and use in civil litigation.

Confidential (C)– National security information or material which requires protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security.

Secret (S)– National security information or material which requires a substantial degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

Top Secret (TS) – National security information or material which requires the highest degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

Index

When, in the course of official duties, emergency management coordinators, liaisons or managers deem it necessary to disseminate sensitive and categorized information, they are permitted to do so as long as the recipient of said information is appropriately cleared for the specified information according to the following table:

Categorization	Clearance	Personnel / Receiver
For Official Use Only public Safety Capacity	N/A	Person acting in an official
Public Safety Sensitive	N/A	Sworn / employed member of a Public Safety Agency
Law Enforcement Sensitive	N/A	Sworn Law Enforcement Officer
Protected Critical Infrastructure	PCII Certified	Sworn / Employed member of a Public Safety Agency
Confidential	Confidential	Person with Confidential clearance through a Federal Agency
Secret	Secret	Person with Secret clearance through a Federal Agency
Top Secret	Top Secret	Person with Top Secret clearance through a Federal Agency

Note: A valid “need to know” must also be established for any of the above.

Implementation Steps

The following section summarizes the goals and objectives listed in the previous section. It identifies specific implementation steps and milestones which will be pursued over the next two years in an effort to achieve the identified goals and objectives.

1. Goal/Objective #1: Align programs with goals

Within six months: Conduct a Division summit with breakout groups to discuss Division goals and to identify priority programs. Develop Division standard operating procedures (SOPs) to address each goal/priority.

Within one year: Review and revise the Division Strategic Plan, organizational chart, taxonomy, and SOPs.

Within two years: Hold an annual Division summit to review goals and programs.

2. Goal/Objective #2: Improve performance measures

Within six months: Initiate Six Sigma Green Belt training for upper management.

Within one year: Continue Six Sigma Green Belt training for upper management. Complete one Six Sigma project. Contribute to IndyStat throughout the year as requested.

Within two years: Adjust performance measures based on Six Sigma training and management review. Contribute to IndyStat throughout the year as requested. Develop and implement one Six Sigma project per year.


3. Goal/Objective #3: Ensure continuity of operations

Within six months: Identify and move into a new and permanent location for the entire Division.

Within one year: Create a continuity of operations plan (COOP) for the Division. Create a Training Section within the Division, identify training priorities for the Division, and develop a training and exercise schedule compatible with the District 5 and national level courses and exercises. Enhance Adult learning potential using experiential training methodologies through curriculums supported by high fidelity training through critical decision making interface and enhanced information delivery technologies. This will enhance responder capabilities offering robust training simulations and event modeling in laboratory environments, plus distance-based educational and gaming technologies, and by offering an Internet based "real life" experience sharing (lessons learned) platform. The essential corner-stone to an

effective resource in Public Safety will be by utilizing and maintaining Mission Essential and Supporting Competencies for each position within the Joint Emergency Operations Center and the 24-7 Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR) that will provide career development and professional standards. The main

outcome design will provide realistic and simulated emergency response and special tactical environments with sufficient fidelity to support the development of best practices related to critical event decision-making, logistics, supply chain management, incident management and robotic/sensor/detector and equipment technologies. Plus the long term evaluation will provide the potential for the effectiveness of the human interface and decision-making related to incident management teams and emergency operation center coordination activities.



The Preparedness Cycle Builds Capabilities

Within two years: Share the COOP template with other city-county agencies and encourage them to complete a COOP. Meet with private sector partners and encourage them to complete COOPs. Finally, establish a reliable, easily replicated post-emergency/disaster environment to test theories, tactics and equipment technologies related to recovery practices. Connect table top to live disaster exercises enhancing exercise player with logistical, supply train management, resource coordination, communications and live tactical evolutions. Develop and test emergency plans, policies and procedures engaging private and public stakeholders.

4. Goal/Objective #4: Create a Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) Section

Within six months: Seek funding to hire two (2) crime analysts, four (4) tactical analysis coordinators, and one (1) program manager for the ISI Section/ Real-time – Analytical – Data – And - Research (RADAR)

Within one year: Develop SOPs, milestones, and performance measures for the R.

Within two years: Have a fully functioning RADAR that acts as a data warehouse to allow for and encourage rapid access to critical information, has the ability to monitor “at large” individuals through field input devices and kiosks, and creates a pro-active and predictive public safety posture.

5. Goal/Objective #5: Prevent/detect radiological/nuclear attacks

Within six months: Identify the first responders (i.e. law enforcement traffic unit) who will be specifically tasked with meeting this objective.

Within one year: Utilize the resources of a newly created Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section (refer to the next section) to identify intelligence gaps in this area and devise an information gathering plan to fill those gaps.

Within two years: Equip appropriately/order equipment for first responders tasked with this objective. Train the personnel on the equipment.

6. Goal/Objective #6: Prevent/detect biological attacks

Within six months: Work with the Health Department to evaluate the status of the bio-defense program in the City and identify ways to improve it.

Within one year: Devise an outreach plan to train communities to react to biological attacks and begin implementation of the plan. Utilize the resources of a newly created RADAR to identify intelligence gaps in this area and devise an information gathering plan to fill those gaps.

Within two years: Conduct joint training among first responder and supporting agencies on how to respond to a biological attack.

7. Goal/Objective #7: Prevent/detect chemical and explosive attacks

Within six months: Identify the top three infrastructure/facilities most vulnerable to this type of threat within the city and devise buffer zone protection plans for them.

Within one year: Utilize the resources of a newly created Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section (refer to the next section) to identify intelligence gaps in this area and devise an information gathering plan to fill those gaps.

Within two years: Conduct joint training among first responder and supporting agencies on how to respond to a chemical/explosive attack and validate the training through exercises.

8. Goal/Objective #8: Protect and strengthen CI/KR

Within six months: Obtain equipment and develop standard operating procedures for vulnerability assessment teams. Members of the vulnerability assessment teams will have been trained on the Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS).

Within one year: Create top 10 CI/KR lists for Marion County and surrounding counties. Input those lists into ACAMS. Develop vulnerability assessments for the top 10 CI/KR sites in Marion County.

Within two years: Identify and prioritize potential protection, prevention and mitigation strategies for high priority risks. Implement the methodology for cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis of risk reduction solutions. Allocate resources to support cost-effective risk reduction solutions. Monitor risk reduction solutions to ensure effectiveness in reducing risk. Initiate vulnerability assessments in the surrounding counties.

9. Goal/Objective #9: Improve cyber security

Within six months: Identify and prioritize potential protection, prevention and mitigation strategies for high priority risks.

Within one year: Implement the methodology for cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis of risk reduction solutions. Allocate resources to support cost-effective risk reduction solutions. Monitor risk reduction solutions to ensure effectiveness in reducing risk.

Within two years: Regularly communicate risk management strategy, including prioritized risks, analysis of risk reduction solutions, progress in reducing risk, and lessons learned to stakeholders.

10. Goal/Objective #10: Ensure preparedness

Within six months: Develop a risk management strategy with short, medium and long-term objectives, that includes systematically assessing risks, prioritizing risks, analyzing and selecting cost-effective solutions, monitoring solutions to ensure risks are reduced, assessing changes in risk and effectiveness of risk management plans, and collecting and sharing lessons learned regarding risk management.

Within one year: Communicate the risk management strategy, in writing, to all stakeholders and ensure strategy is readily available to all stakeholders. Continue community and first responder training (i.e. CERT, ICS courses).

Within two years: Coordinate a full-scale exercise to validate existing plans and training programs. Review and update the Marion County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan (MHMP). Submit grant requests for priority projects identified in the MHMP.

11. Goal/Objective #11: Strengthen response and recovery

Within six months: Enhance GIS capabilities by seeking funding to hire a consultant to facilitate oversight and management of certain GIS projects, such as critical infrastructure protection (and hazard response) to include information systems survivability to ensure adequate systems operations during an emergency. Finalize the long term recovery plan, validate the plan through an exercise, and then train to the plan.

Within one year: Utilize the resources of a newly created Real Time Rapid Analysis Management Section (refer to the next section) to provide responders with information real time to improve response time and response methods.

Within two years: Ensure compliance with state and federal guidelines for catastrophic planning. Develop additional plans, exercise the plans, and train to the plans.

This Division lends an opportunity to address Homeland Security guidelines for hardened public safety facilities like the regional emergency operations center (EOC). Tying the EOC directly to the division of informatics training will permit real time interaction between live training activities and simulated training within the EOC for both EOC personnel and Incident Management personnel such as Incident Management Teams (IMT). Also, establishing a training aspect within Informatics can construct both a training hospital critical decision making and correctional facility interface to be used to prepared and train hospital and correctional facility personnel in disaster management.

Juvenile Court Systems Improvement through Detention Reforms

Judge Marilyn A. Moores

Chief Magistrate Gary Chavers

Magistrate Gael Deppert

Juvenile Chief Probation Officer Christina Ball

Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI)

- A system reform effort focused on eliminating the overuse of secure detention while ensuring public safety
- Data driven
- Increased collaboration with stakeholders
- Transparency in system where possible
- JDAI-Indianapolis began mid-2006

Focus of JDAI Reform Efforts in Marion County


- Creation of a Reception Center
- Re-engineering of Initial Hearing Court
- Expansion of Alternatives to Secure Detention
- Reduction of Detention Population

Reception Center (aka FYI)

- Divert low-risk youth from formal court system through provision of:
 - Crisis intervention
 - De-escalation
 - Family Reunification
 - Referrals to community-based services
 - Follow-up contact with families
- Pilot began July 2007 with community-based nonprofit (Choices, Inc./YES) in 2 police districts
- Moved in-house and expanded city-wide in January 2010 when YES closed

Juvenile Intake Process


Juvenile Arrest Intake Process



Evaluation of Reception Center

- Evaluation completed by Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)
- Included 1,600 youth processed informally through Reception Center, compared with similar youth processed formally through RSR
- Findings:
 - 10% less re-arrest rates
 - Longer period of time between re-arrest
 - No increase in offense type

Family and Youth Intervention (FYI) Program



Initial Hearing Court

- July 2007: Re-engineered Initial Hearing Court
- Gate-keeping function
- Court approves filing of petition based on probable cause AND best interest of child or public
- Between 7/1/07 – 12/31/09:
 - 2,273 Petitions Not Authorized
 - Represents 20.5% of filed petitions (11,067)

Alternatives to Detention


- Programs designed to provide supervision in the community for kids pending adjudication
 - Ensure public safety
 - Improve outcomes for youth
- An average of over 600 kids are supervised in alternatives to detention each day
- Over 4,600 kids were supervised in an alternative program during 2009
- Kids remain in alternative programs an average of 42 days

Pretrial Release Options



PRETRIAL RELEASE CONTINUUM Marion Superior Court Probation Department

These options may be used individually or in any combination to meet the needs of the youth



DRAI = Detention Risk Assessment Instrument Score

Promising Outcomes

Program	Failure to Appear (FTA) Rate	Reoffense Rate				
		Status	Misd	Felony	Warrant (VOP/VOR)	Total
Supervised Release	1.61%	3.00%	8.87%	8.18%	2.03%	22.08%
Curfew	2.53%	4.55%	9.84%	6.98%	1.27%	22.65%
Home Confinement	2.17%	5.63%	7.99%	5.90%	1.27%	20.78%
Evening Reporting	2.56%	3.25%	4.88%	2.44%	3.25%	13.82%
Day Reporting	3.92%	4.00%	4.00%	5.00%	1.00%	14.00%
Electronic Monitoring	1.45%	3.25%	4.87%	8.66%	2.35%	19.13%
Shelter Care	0.50%	1.00%	2.66%	0.50%	0.50%	4.65%
TOTAL	2.11%	3.71%	7.43%	6.32%	1.56%	19.02%

Reoffense rate = 13.75% when limited to only new misdemeanor & felony level offenses


Alternatives: 2008 vs. 2009

- 6% reduction in overall re-offense rate
- Decreases in failure-to-appear (FTA) rates and re-offense rates in every alternative except:
 - FTA rate for Day Reporting*
 - Reoffense rate for Electronic Monitoring
- Goal for 2010-2011 is to reduce re-offense rate to 10% or less

* *Increased from 1 kid out of 85 (2008), to 4 kids out of 100 (2009)*

Detention Statistics


Average Daily Population



34.7% reduction in Average Daily Population
2000 - 2009

Detention Statistics

Total Admissions



64.2% reduction in total admissions
2000 - 2009

Effect on Public Safety

Pre- and Post-Juvenile Systems Improvement (JDAI)

- Total # of detention admissions:

- 2005 = 4,794
- 2009 = 1,993

58.4% REDUCTION

- Average daily population in secure detention:

- 2005 = 154.31
- 2009 = 103

33.3% REDUCTION

- Total # of delinquency referrals:

- 2005 = 8,365
- 2009 = 7,995

4.4% REDUCTION